Constitutional Law by Rato, Michael
RATO SURVEY FORMATTED.DOC 4/18/2001 10:36 AM 
 
552 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE—WHETHER AN 
INMATE’S SINCERELY HELD RELIGIOUS BELIEF IS A COMMANDMENT OR 
SIMPLY AN EXPRESSION OF BELIEF IS IRRELEVANT TO A COURT’S 
DETERMINATION REGARDING THE REASONABLENESS OF ACTIONS 
TAKEN BY PRISON OFFICIALS—DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
Robert P. DeHart (DeHart) was an inmate serving a life 
sentence at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute at Greene, 
Pennsylvania (SCI-Greene).  DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 48 (3d Cir. 
2000).  While incarcerated, DeHart converted to Buddhism under 
the direction of the City of 10,000 Buddhas, a Buddhist educational 
center.  De Hart claimed that his personal study of the First Precept 
of Buddhism, which forbids killing in any form, led him to the 
conclusion that he was religiously obligated to follow a vegetarian 
diet.  As a result, DeHart requested that SCI-Greene provide him 
with a vegetarian diet consistent with his beliefs. 
While the prison officials at SCI-Greene did not challenge the 
sincerity of DeHart’s religious beliefs, they refused to provide such a 
meal.  The provisions for all inmate meals served at SCI-Greene 
were purchased in bulk and the menu was the same for all inmates.  
Although the prison served special therapeutic meals to inmates 
who required them as a matter of medical necessity, these meals 
consisted of smaller portions of the same foods served to the general 
population.  DeHart claimed that his request could be 
accommodated by simply doubling the amount of vegetables and 
grains he was served and adding a soy milk supplement.  The 
prison officials refused, reasoning that providing DeHart with a 
vegetarian meal would create a burden on the administration of the 
prison meal system and create jealousy among other inmates. 
DeHart filed a written grievance with the prison 
administration.  Id. at 50.  This grievance was denied, and the 
Superintendent of SCI-Greene, James Price (Price), affirmed the 
prison officials’ decision.  DeHart subsequently appealed this 
decision to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Central 
Office Review Committee, which upheld Price’s decision.  In 
response to this denial, DeHart filed a lawsuit against Price and 
Martin Horn, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, 
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claiming that his free exercise and equal protection rights as 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution had been violated. 
DeHart first requested a preliminary injunction to compel the 
prison officials to provide him with a vegetarian meal until his claim 
could be heard on the merits.  Id. at 50.  After a preliminary 
injunction hearing, a magistrate judge recommended that injunctive 
relief be denied based upon a finding that vegetarianism was not a 
central tenet of Buddhism.  Id.  The District Court adopted this 
recommendation and denied the injunction, whereupon DeHart 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  
Id.  While the court of appeals upheld the denial of injunctive relief 
in an unreported memorandum opinion, it warned the district court 
not to make judgments regarding the centrality of vegetarianism to 
Buddhist belief.  Id.  
On remand, the parties engaged in additional discovery and 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  Id.  The magistrate 
judge ultimately recommended that summary judgment be granted 
on behalf of the prison officials.  Id.  DeHart objected to the adoption 
of the magistrate’s report because it was again based on the finding 
that vegetarianism was not a central aspect of the Buddhist faith.  Id.  
Despite DeHart’s objections, the district court adopted that 
magistrate judge’s recommendation and entered summary 
judgment for the prison officials.  Id. 
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in an unreported opinion.  Id.  Subsequently, the en banc 
Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred by failing to 
examine whether DeHart retained other means of expressing his 
religious beliefs, and by justifying its decision with the finding that 
vegetarianism was not a commandment of Buddhism.  Id. at 54-56. 
Writing for the unanimous en banc panel, Judge Stapleton 
commenced the court’s analysis by observing that DeHart did not 
relinquish his constitutional rights solely by virtue of his 
incarceration.  Id. at 50.  Nevertheless, the judge stressed the fact that 
the myriad interests served by the prison system, such as the 
rehabilitation of inmates and security concerns, necessitated the 
abridgement of constitutional rights in the penal context.  Id. at 50-
51.  As a result, the court noted, prisoners are afforded constitutional 
protection only insofar as their rights do not run afoul of “the 
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”  Id. at 51 
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 
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The court proceeded to explain that the proper standard of 
review for prison regulations that burden the constitutional rights of 
inmates was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Turner 
v. Safley.  Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).  The Turner 
factors, Judge Stapleton noted, attempt to balance the prison 
officials’ interest in furthering the objectives of the penal system, 
while at the same time protecting an inmate’s constitutional 
prerogatives to the extent consistent with the fact of incarceration.  
Id.  The court acknowledged that the ultimate indication of 
constitutional validity under Turner is a court’s finding that the 
particular prison regulation at issue “is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”  Id.  (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 
84).  Judge Stapleton maintained that in conducting such an 
analysis, the court must give due deference not only to the 
prisoner’s constitutional rights, but the necessary regulatory power 
of prison officials.  Id.  Especially important, the judge cautioned, 
were the separation of powers concerns raised by inappropriate 
judicial analysis of the “increasingly urgent problems of prison 
administration” that are appropriately left to authorities of the other 
branches of government.  Id.  (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 
396, 405 (1974)). 
Next, the court articulated the four “reasonableness” factors 
announced by the Supreme Court in Turner.  Id.  First, the court 
noted that the prison regulation at issue must bear a rational 
relationship to some legitimate interest served by the penal system.  
Id.  The court explained that this interest must be sufficiently 
furthered by the regulation so as to not be rendered arbitrary.  Id.  
The second factor, the court stated, was the availability of 
alternative methods the inmate retained to exercise the burdened 
constitutional right.  Id.  Third, the court declared that a reviewing 
court must evaluate the impact of allowing the exercise of the 
constitutional right on the prison community as a whole.  Id.  The 
fourth and final factor, the court explained, was whether alternative 
means existed whereby prison officials could accommodate the 
inmate’s request with a de minimus impact on the penological goals 
of the prison.  Id. 
The court indicated, however, that two prerequisites must be 
satisfied before conducting a Turner analysis.  Id.  Specifically, the 
court explained, an inmate’s beliefs allegedly burdened by a prison 
regulation must be (1) genuinely held and (2) religious in nature.  Id.  
These predicates were necessary, Judge Stapleton opined, in order 
to protect prison regulations from constant attacks based not on 
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inmates’ constitutionally protected religious beliefs, but on mere 
secular preferences.  Id. at 52.  With respect to DeHart’s claim, the 
court stated that these prerequisites were not in issue because the 
prison officials stipulated that DeHart’s request for a vegetarian diet 
was a result of his genuine subjective interpretation of the First 
Precept of Buddhism.  Id. 
With this threshold matter resolved, the court went on to 
address the first Turner factor: the connection between the prison 
officials’ refusal to provide DeHart with a vegetarian meal and some 
relevant penal interest.  Id.  The court noted that the prison officials 
set forth two justifications for their refusal to accommodate 
DeHart’s religiously compelled vegetarianism: the need for a 
simplified prison menu plan, and the prevention of jealousy by 
other inmates over DeHart’s perceived special treatment.  Id.  
Evaluating other Third Circuit cases that addressed the validity of 
prison officials’ interest in an efficient food system, Judge Stapleton 
concluded that the rationales set forth by the prison officials in the 
present case were legitimate penological concerns.  Id. at 52-53 
(discussing Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Specifically, 
the court found that the therapeutic meals already prepared by the 
prison kitchen complicated the inmate meal process, and obliging 
DeHart’s request would have an incremental, albeit minor, impact 
on prison efficiency.  Id. at 53.  Furthermore, the court held that 
providing DeHart with a meal in accordance with his religious 
scruples could result in jealousy among the other inmates.  Id.  As a 
result, the court concluded, the prison officials’ refusal to 
accommodate DeHart’s request was sufficiently related to the 
penological interests asserted.  Id. 
Rather than concluding the analysis into the reasonableness of 
the prison officials’ decision, the court explained, this judgment only 
served to meet the first requirement of Turner.  Id.  While the finding 
of a sufficient connection between the prison officials’ decision and 
legitimate penal objectives was essential, the court explained, the 
reasonableness determination proposed by Turner also mandates 
that a court inquire into the impact of accommodating the inmate’s 
request on the prison system in some other manner, as well as any 
alternative regulations that could serve the prison’s interests while 
lessening the burden on the inmate’s constitutional rights.  Id. 
With this caveat, the court moved on to the second Turner 
factor, the alternative means by which DeHart could exercise his 
Buddhist beliefs despite the prison officials’ refusal to provide him 
with a vegetarian meal.  Id.  Judge Stapleton stated the evaluation of 
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the second Turner factor as an alternative inquiry: If the prison 
officials could show that DeHart had other means by which to 
pursue his free-exercise rights, the court should be especially 
deferential to the prison officials’ judgment regarding the 
reasonableness of the restriction; alternatively, if DeHart possessed 
no other way of exercising his religious beliefs, this factor would 
weigh in favor of his claim.  Id. at 53.  The initial question, the court 
noted, was determining the proper definition of “alternative means 
of exercising the right” to free exercise of religion.  Id. (quoting 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989)).  The judge explained 
that on several occasions, the Supreme Court has announced that 
the right in question must be interpreted expansively.  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Therefore, the court explained, the appropriate definition 
of the right asserted by DeHart was his ability to engage in Buddhist 
practices generally, not merely his access to a vegetarian meal.  Id. at 
54. 
The court found that DeHart was allowed to engage in several 
expressions of his religious belief, such as praying and meditating in 
his cell, reciting the Sutras, and corresponding with Buddhist 
authorities.  Id.  Furthermore, the court explained, DeHart was 
permitted by the prison officials to obtain items made out of canvas, 
instead of those made out of leather, in order to accommodate his 
belief that forbade him from using anything that resulted from the 
killing of a living thing.  Id. 
Although the court acknowledged that these facts must be 
taken into consideration in determining whether the prison officials’ 
restriction was reasonable, the court decided to remand 
consideration of the second Turner factor to the district court.  Id.  
The judge observed that when originally evaluating the second 
Turner factor, the district court relied on earlier decisions of the 
Third Circuit which made a distinction between religious 
“commandments” and “positive expressions of belief.”  Id.  The 
Court found this distinction to be inappropriate.  Id.  The district 
court also erred in evaluating the second Turner factor, the court 
determined, by finding that DeHart’s request for a vegetarian meal 
was unfounded because it was not mandated by the “three major 
traditions of Buddhist practice.”  Id. at 55.  The court reasoned that 
while such determinations were supported in part by the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998), 
Johnson was inconsistent with several opinions of the Supreme 
Court and the circuit’s own case law.  Id. at 56 (citing Johnson, 150 
F.3d at 282). 
RATO SURVEY FORMATTED.DOC 4/18/2001  10:36 AM 
2000] SURVEYS 557 
In Johnson, the court explained, the Third Circuit determined 
that the alternative means of expression inquiry mandated by the 
second Turner factor was irrelevant in those cases in which the 
asserted practice was a “commandment” of the religion, rather than 
simply an “expression of belief.”  Id. at 55 (quoting Johnson, 150 F.3d 
at 282).  Judge Stapleton, however, noted that this evaluation was 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S 342 (1987).  Id. at 56.  In O’Lone, the judge noted, 
when determining whether a prison’s decision to preclude a group 
of Muslim inmates from attending a weekly Jumu’ah worship 
service central to Islamic beliefs was reasonable, the Supreme Court 
focused on whether the inmates retained the ability to express their 
Muslim beliefs in any other way—irrespective of whether there was 
any other way to engage in Jumu’ah.  Id. at 53 (citing O’Lone, 482 
U.S. at 351).  As a result, the court held that the 
commandment/positive expression distinction was incompatible 
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in O’Lone, and overruled 
Johnson’s analysis of the second Turner factor.  Id. at 55. 
 
 
Likewise, the court expressed reservations regarding the 
district court’s reasoning that DeHart’s request for a vegetarian meal 
was entitled to less constitutional protection because it was not 
orthodox compared to the traditional doctrines of Buddhist 
teaching.  Id.  Judge Stapleton noted that it was inconsistent with a 
long line of Supreme Court decisions, most notably Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), for a judge to inquire into the 
“centrality” of a particular religious practice.  Id. at 56.  Although the 
Smith decision was badly fractured, the court noted, all of the 
concurring and dissenting opinions approved of the plurality’s 
assertion that “it is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity 
of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”  Id.  (quoting 
Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (internal citations omitted)).  
While noting that the record evidence indicated that DeHart 
retained alternative means of exercising his religious beliefs, the 
court nonetheless indicated that it would require the district court to 
reevaluate the second Turner factor.  Id. at 57. 
The court then turned its attention to the district court’s 
analysis of the third and fourth factors of the Tuner test.  Id.  With 
respect to the third Turner factor—the impact accommodating 
DeHart’s request would have on inmates, guards, and other 
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resources—the court disapproved of the district court’s holding.  Id.  
The district court had held that because there was no 
uncontroverted evidence regarding the impact of DeHart’s request 
on the prison community, the third factor was neutral.  Id.  Judge 
Stapleton, however, held this conflict had to be resolved with 
findings of fact before the district court could even undertake the 
weighing analysis of Turner.  Id.  Particularly troubling, the court 
noted, was the fact that DeHart claimed that prison officials were 
able to accommodate the dietary requests of Jewish inmates, while 
not affording the same accommodation to DeHart.  Id.  While the 
court noted that some reasoned distinction may exist between the 
accommodation of Jewish inmates and DeHart’s request for a 
vegetarian meal, the fact that one was not asserted in the record 
precluded the district court from properly evaluating the third 
Turner factor.  Id. at 59.  Likewise, the court explained that the 
district court’s evaluation of the fourth factor—whether de minimis 
alternatives existed to accommodate DeHart’s request for a 
vegetarian diet—suffered from the same infirmities.  Id. 
Finally, the court reversed summary judgment on behalf of the 
prison officials based upon a finding that the district court 
improperly evaluated the overall balancing test required by Turner.  
Id.  As the court explained, the district court based summary 
judgment on the fact that the first two Turner factors weighed in 
favor of the prison officials, while the last two factors were neutral.  
Id.  Putting aside the district court’s errors in evaluating the Turner 
factors individually, the court found that the Turner test “does not 
call for placing each factor in one of two columns and tallying a 
numerical result.”  Id.  The Turner standard, the court elucidated, is 
to assess the overall reasonableness of the prison officials’ denial of 
DeHart’s request.  Id.  In the present case, the court explained, the 
prison officials’ asserted interests were efficiency and prevention of 
inmate jealousy.  Id.  The court found, however, that these interests 
were undercut by the prison’s existing policy of serving inmates 
therapeutic meals separately with no apparent effect on inmate 
jealousy, and the fact that DeHart’s requested meal would only 
force the prison officials to obtain a relatively inexpensive soy-milk 
supplement.  Id.  In light of these facts, the court reversed summary 
judgment and remanded the case to the district court for a more in-
depth analysis of the Turner factors.  Id. at 60. 
After concluding the analysis of DeHart’s free exercise claim, 
the court turned to consideration of his equal protection claim.  Id. at 
61.  The court explained that DeHart’s equal protection claim relied 
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on the fact that he was denied the right to have a vegetarian meal in 
accordance with his Buddhist beliefs, while the Jewish inmates in 
Johnson were given a kosher meal in accordance with their faith.  Id.  
Noting that the four Turner factors were applicable to this claim as 
well, the court explained that DeHart’s equal protection claim must 
fail if the prison officials’ decision to deny him a vegetarian meal 
was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”  Id. 
(quoting Clark v. Groose, 36 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1994)).  The court, 
however, explained that the justification for such a distinction had 
not been explained by the prison officials or the district court below.  
Id.  As a result, the court remanded consideration of this issue to the 
district court as well.  Id. 
In DeHart, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reconciled its free exercise jurisprudence with the holdings 
of the Supreme Court.  Although this decision may have the 
unintended effect of lessening the free exercise protection afforded 
to inmates because those activities which are religious 
“commandments” are no longer entitled to heightened protection, 
the commandment/expression of belief distinction is not an 
appropriate forum for judicial decision making.  Given today’s 
religiously pluralistic society, the judiciary has reasonably declined 
to serve as a moderator of religious orthodoxy, limiting its analysis 
to the sincerity of an inmate claiming a free exercise violation.  
Although the Turner standard may narrow the constitutional 
protections accorded to religious freedoms the, the Third Circuit 
wisely refused to dismiss DeHart’s claim based upon a judicial 
interpretation of Buddhist ecclesiastical concerns. 
Michael Rato 
